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Quantifying Notes Revisited
Hans van Ditmarsch∗
Abstract
In this survey we review several dynamic epistemic logics with modalities rep-
resenting quantification over information change. Of such logics we present typical
axioms involving the relation between knowledge or belief and informative action,
their relative expressivity, directions for applications, and what is known on the de-
cidability and complexity of model checking and satisfiability. We focus on open
problems and new directions for research.
1 Introduction
To a multi-agent logic of knowledge or belief we can add public announcements to model
publicly observed information change, or action models to model information change that
is differently observed by different agents, but also modalities representing quantification
over such information change, such as quantifiers over announcements or quantifiers over
actions models. Such additions may result in more complex or undecidable logics, and
create a very open landscape of relative expressivity. The survey [88] of such logics focused
on open problems. Some such open problems have since then been resolved, and yet others
have come to the fore. In this updated survey we review what is known about such logics
with quantification over information change, including digressions into what are known as
relation changing modal (but often not epistemic) logics. Again we focus on open problems.
Different ways to quantify over information change include (where ϕ is a formula, and
where G is a subset of the set of all agents):
• there is a public announcement after which ϕ [21];
• there is a public announcement by the agents in group G after which ϕ [3];
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• there is an informative action after which ϕ [59];
• there is a refinement after which ϕ [34].
A public announcement is an informative action, but there are also other informative
actions such as private announcements. We represent such informative actions as action
models and also in other ways such as arrow updates. Quantifying over announcements
involving a group of agents facilitates the formalization of notions of ability and agency
in this setting. Such logics with quantifiers over information change are often presented
with individual knowledge modalities but some recent studies have also looked at the
interaction with group epistemic modalities, although for such cases few, if any, Hilbert-
style axiomatizations exist. The refinement in the third item is the dual of simulation: from
the bisimulation requirements, a refinement relation satisfies atoms and back. There are
subtle differences between ‘there is an informative action’ and ‘there is a refinement’, but
the two come quite close. This similarity opens perspectives to compare dynamic epistemic
logics with so-called relation changing modal logics. For example, refinement is iterated
sabotage.
Section 2 provides the technical background. Section 3 is on arbitrary public announce-
ment logic and its variations. Section 4 is on group announcement logic and coalition
announcement logic. These are also variations of arbitrary public announcement logic, but
modelling aspects of agency, ability or strategy. Section 5 is on logics quantifying over
action models, Section 6 is on quantification in arrow update logics, and Section 7 is on
refinement modal logics. These logics are somewhat interrelated. Sections 8 and 9 are more
exploratory in character and focus, respectively, on iterated information change, such as
iterated relativization, and on relation changing modal logics.
2 Dynamic epistemic logic
In this section we present some technical prerequisites before plunging into the variations of
these logics involving quantification. Readers familiar with such basics are suggested to skip
the section. We present multi-agent epistemic logic, on the general level of a multimodal
logic, as well as public announcement logic and action model logic. Prerequisites for arrow
update logic are in Section 6.
The language, structures, and semantics are as follows.
Languages Given a countable set of propositional variables (atoms) P and a finite set of
agents A, we consider four different basic logical languages that we will later expand with
quantifiers. The elements of the language are the formulas.
L(∅) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
L(♦) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦aϕ
L(♦, !) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦aϕ | 〈ϕ〉ϕ
L(♦,⊗) ∋ ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦aϕ | 〈Ee〉ϕ
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where p ∈ P , a ∈ A, and where Ee is a finite action model only explained and defined
further below. Other propositional connectives are defined by abbreviation and we also
define aϕ by abbreviation as ¬♦a¬ϕ and similarly [ϕ]ψ and [Ee]ψ. For ♦aϕ we read
‘agent a considers ϕ possible’ and for aϕ, ‘agent a knows ϕ’ or ‘necessarily ϕ’. For 〈ϕ〉ψ
we read ‘(ϕ is true and) after announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)’. In the literature, formulas
[ϕ]ψ and 〈ϕ〉ψ are often written as [!ϕ]ψ and 〈!ϕ〉ψ. This explains the ! in the language
definition (and later, in the language extended with quantification over announcements).
Given a formula ϕ, v(ϕ) is the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ, and d(ϕ) is
the modal depth or -depth of ϕ. The definition of -depth is not entirely obvious: d(p) =
∅, d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ), d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)}, d(♦aϕ = d(ϕ) + 1, d(〈ϕ〉ψ = d(ϕ) + d(ψ),
d(〈!〉ϕ) = d(ϕ).
Structures An epistemic model M = (S,R, V ) consists of a domain S of states (or
‘worlds’), an accessibility function R : A → P(S × S), where each R(a) is an accessibility
relation, and a valuation V : P → P(S), where each V (p) represents the set of states where
p is true. For R(a) we write Ra, and for (s, t) ∈ Ra we may write Ra(s, t) or Rast. For
s ∈ S, a pair (M, s), for which we write Ms, is an epistemic state, also known as a pointed
Kripke model. The model class without any restrictions is K. The class of models where
all accessibility relations are equivalence relations is S5. If Ra is an equivalence relation
we write s ∼a t instead of Rast, and the relation is then called indistinguishability relation.
Let models M = (S,R, V 〉 and M ′ = (S ′, R′, V ′〉 be given. A non-empty relation
Z ⊆ S × S ′ is a bisimulation between M and M ′, notation Z : M ≃ M ′, if for all pairs
(s, s′) ∈ Z (Zss′) and a ∈ A:
atoms s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ P ;
forth if Rast, then there is a t
′ ∈ S ′ such that R′as
′t′ and Ztt′;
back if R′as
′t′, then there is a t ∈ S such that Rast and Ztt
′.
We write M ≃ M ′ if there is a bisimulation between M and M ′, and we write Ms ≃ M
′
s′
if there is a bisimulation between M and M ′ linking with Zss′.
Similarly, a simulation satisfies atoms and forth, notation M M ′, whereas its dual,
the refinement satisfies atoms and back, notation M M ′.
A (to Q) restricted bisimulation ZQ is a bisimulation that satisfies atoms for all variables
Q ⊆ P , in notation M ≃Q M ′. A (by n) bounded bisimulation Zn satisfies forth and back
up to depth n ∈ N, formally we define this as a set Z0 ⊇ Z1 · · · ⊆ Zn of i-bisimulations for
0 ≤ i ≤ n, see [30] for details. We write M ≃n M ′ for n-bisimilar models M and M ′.
Semantics of PAL We first give the semantics for truthful public announcement logic
(PAL) [75]. Assume an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ), and let s ∈ S. We define Ms |= ϕ
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by induction.
Ms |= p iff s ∈ Vp
Ms |= ¬ϕ iff Ms 6|= ϕ
Ms |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ms |= ϕ and Ms |= ψ
Ms |= ♦aϕ iff there is a t ∈ S such that Rast and Mt |= ϕ
Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ iff Ms |= ψ and (M |ψ)s |= ϕ
where M |ψ := (S ′, R′, V ′〉 such that S ′ := {s ∈ S | Ms |= ψ}, R
′
a := Ra ∩ (S
′ × S ′), and
V ′(p) := V (p) ∩ S ′. A formula ϕ is valid if for all models M and states s in the domain of
M , Ms |= ϕ. Given M = (S,R, V ), formula ϕ is distinguishing between T ⊆ S and S \ T
if for all t ∈ T , Mt |= ϕ and for all t /∈ T , Mt 6|= ϕ (or vice versa; if ϕ is distinguishing,
then ¬ϕ as well).
Example 1 Agent a is uncertain about p (she cannot distinguish state 1 where p is true
from state 0 where p is false). The actual state 1 is underlined. After truthful announce-
ment !p, she knows that p. We have thatM1 |= 〈p〉ap becauseM1 |= p and (M |p)1 |= ap.
Note that we also have, e.g., M1 |= p∧¬ap, so, strangely, as ap implies ¬p∨ap which
is equivalent to ¬(p∧¬ap) we have that M1 |= 〈p∧¬ap〉¬(p∧¬ap). We can visualize
this model and the updated model in different ways, we both depict it with all pairs in
the relation, and in a simpler way for S5 models assuming: reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity (not evident from this but from later figures) of the relation.
0 1
a
a
a a p
⇒ 1
a
0
0 1
a p
⇒ 1
Axiomatization of PAL The axiomatization of minimal modal logic K contains ax-
iom a(ϕ → ψ) → aϕ → aψ and derivation rule ‘From ϕ infer aϕ’ (apart from
propositional features). The modal logic S5 additionally contains, for all agents a, axioms
aϕ → ϕ, aϕ → aaϕ, and ¬aϕ → a¬aϕ. There are no multi-agent interaction
axioms. The logic PAL extends K or S5 (or yet other modal logics). The crucial so-called
reduction axioms involving what an agent knows after an announcement are
[ψ]ap↔ (ψ → p)
[ψ]aϕ↔ (ψ → a[ψ]ϕ)
Expressivity Given two logics L1 and L2 defined over the same class of models, L1 is at
least as expressive as L2, if for every formula ϕ2 in the language of L2 there is a formula
ϕ1 in the language of L1 such that ϕ1 is satisfied by precisely the class of pointed models
that satisfy ϕ2. If L1 is at least as expressive as L2 and L2 is at least as expressive as L1
then L1 and L2 are as expressive. If L1 is at least as expressive as L2 and L2 is not at least
as expressive as L1 then L1 is more expressive than L2.
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By way of reduction axioms as the above, public announcement logic PAL is shown
to be as expressive as multi-agent epistemic logic K (with respect to model class K) and
as expressive as the logic S5 (with respect to model class S5). As epistemic actions can
be eliminated from formulas by axioms such as the above, it can be shown they every
formula with dynamic modalities is equivalent to a formula without modalities. These
axioms function as reduction rules. The dynamic modality is pushed ever more inward
until it gets eliminated by an application of the first axiom above, where on the right-hand
side of the equation there is one less public announcement modality than on the left-hand
side (namely [ψ] is no longer there on the right, although all subformulas of shape [χ1]χ2
of formula ψ occur both left and right). See [64] for a general approach.
Action models An action model [25] (or event model) is a structure like a Kripke
model but with a precondition function instead of a valuation function. An action model
E = (S,R, pre) consists of a domain S of actions, an accessibility function R : A→ P(S×S),
where each Ra is an accessibility relation, and a precondition function pre : S → L, where
L is a logical language. A pointed action model Ee is an epistemic action.
Performing an epistemic action in an epistemic state means computing their restricted
modal product. This product encodes the new state of information. It is defined as follows.
Given an model M = (S,R, V ) action model E = (S,R, pre), the update (M ⊗ E) =
(S ′, R′, V ′) is such that
S ′ = {(t, f) | Mt |= pre(f)}
((t, f), (t′, f ′)) ∈ R′a iff Ratt
′ and Raff
′
(t, f) ∈ V ′(p) iff t ∈ V (p)
In other words: the domain consists of the product domain but restricted to (state, action)
pairs (t, f) such that Mt |= pre(f), i.e., such that the action can be executed in that state;
an agent considers a pair (t, f) possible in the next epistemic state if she considered the
previous state t possible, and the execution of action f in that state; and the valuations
do not change after action execution.
Language and semantics of AML As already noted, the language L(♦,⊗) of action
model logic AML contains an additional inductive construct
〈Ee〉ϕ
standing for ‘there is an execution of action model Ee after which ϕ (is true)’, and where
it is required that the domain of E is finite. This clause 〈Ee〉ϕ is properly recursive: it
says that, given the (finite number) |D(E)| preconditions of E, that are formulas, and the
formula ϕ, the expression 〈Ee〉ϕ is again a formula. For this, one needs to see the set of
all action model frames as an additional parameter of the logical language, apart from the
agent A and the atoms P . As the finite action model frames can be enumerated, this is a
countable set.
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The definition of modal depth d(ϕ) can be extended to ϕ = 〈Ee〉ψ, namely as the sum
of d(ψ) and the maximum depth of the preconditions in E.
The semantics for epistemic actions is as follows.
Ms |= 〈Ee〉ψ iff Ms |= pre(e) and (M ⊗E)(s,e) |= ψ
A truthful public announcement is a singleton action model, with as precondition the
announcement formula ϕ, accessible to all agents: Ra = {(e, e)} for all a ∈ A, where
D(E) = {e}.
Example 2 Consider an epistemic state wherein two agents a, b are uncertain about the
value of an atom p, and where p is true. Further, consider the epistemic action representing
that agent a learns that p is true, but that agent b is uncertain if that has happened or not
(i.e., or if nothing has happened). The epistemic action consists of two actions that have
been named after their preconditions p and ⊤. They can be distinguished by agent a but
not by agent b.
0 1 ⊗ p
⊤
= (1, p)
(0,⊤) (1,⊤)
ab
ab
b bb
The result of executing the action is depicted on the right. The point of the structure is the
one with precondition p. It can only be execution in the state wherein p is true. In fact, a
is learning that p, but b is uncertain between that action and the ‘trivial’ action wherein
nothing is learnt. The trivial action has precondition ⊤. The trivial action can be executed
in both states of the initial model. Therefore, the resulting structure contains three states.
The accessibility relations in the resulting information state are calculated from the initial
information state and the action model. For example, (0,⊤) ∼b (1, p) because 0 ∼b 1 and
⊤ ∼b p. Whereas (0,⊤) 6∼a (1, p) because ⊤ 6∼a p, even though 0 ∼a 1.
Axiomatization Two crucial axioms of action model logic AML are
[Ee]p ↔ (pre(e)→ p)
[Ee]aψ ↔ (pre(e)→
∧
Raef
a[Ef ]ψ)
The axiom for knowledge after public announcement in the previous paragraph is a special
case of the above, where there is only one accessible action.
Similarly to PAL, by way of reduction axioms as the above action model logic AML is
shown to be as expressive as multi-agent epistemic logic K (or S5, depending on the class
of models).
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Arrow Update Logic Another general framework for dynamic epistemic logic is arrow
update logic [65], of which a generalized version as expressive as action model logic has
also been proposed [66]. We will introduce it in Section 6 dedicated to quantification over
arrow updates.
3 Arbitrary announcement
3.1 Language and semantics
Arbitrary public announcement logic APAL [21] contains a quantifier over announcements.
Its language L(♦, !, 〈!〉) is obtained from L(♦, !) by adding an inductive clause 〈!〉ϕ, where
〈!〉 is a (APAL) quantifier. We often call a formula in L(♦, !) a quantifier-free formula.
Given model Ms and ϕ ∈ L(!, 〈!〉), we then define
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
The formula ψ is called a witness for quantifier 〈!〉. Given that PAL and K are equally
expressive, 〈!〉 quantifies over the modally definable subsets of a given model.
For 〈!〉ϕ we read ‘after arbitrary/any announcement, ϕ (is true)’. As we see from the
above semantics, this is imprecise, because these need to be quantifier-free announcements.
Without yet other restrictions, the definition would otherwise be circular, as to determine
whether 〈!〉ϕ we then would have to check the truth of 〈〈!〉ϕ〉ϕ.
Example 3 Agent a can either make a truly informative announcement !p or a trivial
announcement !⊤. We have that M1 |= 〈!〉ap because M1 |= 〈p〉ap. On the other hand,
M1 |= 〈!〉¬ap because M1 |= 〈⊤〉¬ap. Of course we do not have M1 |= 〈!〉(ap∧¬ap).
0 1 0 1 1
M ′′ M M ′
a a⊤
⇐
p
⇒
3.2 Validities
An illustrative validity is: 〈!〉(ap ∨ a¬p). This formalizes that the agent a can al-
ways learn the value of an atomic proposition. Either p is true, in which case the agent
knows it after its announcement (or, in case it already knew that p, still knows it after its
announcement), or it is false, in which case the agent knows that it is false after the an-
nouncement that p is false (the argument also applies on K models). Interestingly enough,
〈!〉(aϕ∨a¬ϕ) is an S5 validity for all (satisfiable) ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉) [96] (it is unclear if this
result holds on class K). Some schematic validities of interest are as follows. Church-Rosser
only holds on class S5; it is unclear if McKinsey holds on class K.
• 〈!〉〈!〉ϕ→ 〈!〉ϕ (4)
This expresses that a sequence of two announcements ψ and χ is again an announce-
ment, namely 〈ψ〉χ (or ψ ∧ [ψ]χ).
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• [!]ϕ→ ϕ (T)
If ϕ is true after any announcement, it is true after the trivial announcement.
• 〈!〉[!]ϕ→ [!]〈!〉ϕ (Church-Rosser)
Given Ms and announcements ψ and χ, there are two consecutive announcements
ψ′ and χ′ such that the same (or bisimilar) epistemic state results: (M |ϕ|ϕ′)s ≃
(M |ψ|ψ′)s.
• [!]〈!〉ϕ→ 〈!〉[!]ϕ (McKinsey)
In combination with 4 this formalizes a property known as atomicity [30].
Proofs of the above properties can be found in [21], except for CR, of which the proof
found there is incorrect, and for which a correct proof can be found in [91].
The operator 〈!〉 seems therefore to behave like the modality of the logic S4. However,
note that PAL and APAL are not normal modal logics, as they do not satisfy uniform
substitution. For example, p→ 〈!〉ap is valid but (p∧¬ap)→ 〈!〉a(p∧¬ap) is invalid
(see Example 1).
Example 4 This nice counterexample to Church-Rosser on K is due to Louwe Kuijer.
Given a single agent, considerM = (S,R, V ) given by S = {s, t, u}, R = {(s, t), (t, t), (t, u)}
and V (p) = {s, t}. We now have thatMs |= 〈!〉[!]♦⊤, with the witness being the announce-
ment p which makes s and t bisimilar. Yet we also have Ms 6|= [!]〈!〉♦⊤, since after the
announcement p we are left with only the state s. As it has no successors, no further
announcement can make ♦⊤ true. A depiction is:
s(p) t(p) u(¬p) p⇒ s(p) t(p)
p
⇐s(p) ≃ s(p)
Knowability The schema 〈!〉aϕ, for ‘there is an announcement after which the agent
knows ϕ’, can be seen as an interpretation of ‘ϕ is knowable,’ a suggestion made by van
Benthem in [80]. Thus, APAL provides an actual setting to investigate Fitch’s knowability
paradox [46]. Fitch addressed the question whether what is true can become known and in
[46] he demonstrated that the existence of unknown truths (there is a ϕ for which ϕ∧¬aϕ)
is inconsistent with the requirement that all truths are knowable (for any ψ, ψ → 〈!〉aψ).
The inconsistency appears by substituting p ∧ ¬ap for ψ.
An interesting APAL validity for the Fitch setting is 〈!〉(aϕ∨a¬ϕ) [96]. This states
that in APAL ‘everything is knowable’.
Its validity can be shown by announcing the value of all variables occurring in ϕ, and
then showing that in any model M with a constant valuation for those variables, and for
any ψ only containing those variables, M |= ψ → aψ. Therefore M |= ϕ → aϕ and
M |= ¬ϕ→ a¬ϕ, so that in such a model we have M |= aϕ ∨a¬ϕ.
Such knowability comes at a price: the Moore-sentence p ∧ ¬ap is knowable, because
after being truthfully announced, agent a knows that it is false, as we saw in Example 1.
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3.3 Expressivity
On the class of S5 models for a single agent, APAL is as expressive as PAL, whereas for
more than one agent, APAL is more expressive than PAL [21]. There are two different
proofs of this result. We present them in some detail as both kinds of proof have been used
to obtain expressivity results for different versions of APAL.
The APAL quantifier 〈!〉 implicitly quantifies over countably many atoms and also im-
plicitly quantifies over arbitrarily large modal depth (where the modal depth is the number
of stacked -operators). These properties can be independently used to demonstrate larger
expressivity of APAL.
On the assumption that a particular formula ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉) is equivalent to a formula
ψ ∈ L(♦, !), we use that ψ must contain a finite number of atoms, or that ψ is of finite
modal depth. Given that, we can choose two models that have a different value for ϕ but
must have the same value for ψ, which is a contradiction, so that therefore such a ψ does
not exist. As L(♦, !) ⊆ L(♦, !, 〈!〉), this not merely demonstrates that APAL is at least
as expressive as PAL, but even that it is more expressive. Such expressivity results can
also be shown with Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse´ games [43]. The method above seems suitable for
quantified dynamic epistemic logics because it is succinct.
Implicit quantification over all atoms First, let us use the argument that 〈!〉 quan-
tifies over all atoms. Consider the formula ϕ = 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap). Let us assume that
ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉) is equivalent to ψ ∈ L(♦, !). Then there is an atom q ∈ P such that
q 6∈ v(ψ). Consider the following two models for variables p and q (where the value of
other variables does not matter, and where in M , the value of q does not matter; 10 means
that p is true and q is false, etc.).
M1 0 1
a
M ′10 00 10
01 11
a
a
b b p∨q⇒
10
01 11
a
b
We now have that
M1 6|= 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap)
because there are only two possible model restrictions, the trivial one after which ap
remains false, and the restriction to the p-state, after ap is true but then also bap.
We also have that
M ′10 |= 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap)
because
M ′10 |= 〈p ∨ q〉(ap ∧ ¬bap)
as M ′|(p ∨ q), 10 |= ap ∧ ¬bap.
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On the other hand, M1 ≃
P\{q} M ′10 and therefore by bisimulation invariance
M1 |= ψ iff M
′
10 |= ψ
Implicit quantification over any finite modal depth The other proof of the larger
expressivity of APAL uses that 〈!〉 quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large epistemic
depth. It is due to Barteld Kooi.
Again, consider ϕ = 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap), and again, let us assume that ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉)
is equivalent to ψ ∈ L(♦, !). Let d(ψ) = n. Consider the models depicted below.
0
≃
1M1 :
a
0
≃
1 1 0M1 :
a b a
0 1 1 0 1 1 0M1 :
a b a > d(ψ) b a
0
ψ
⇒
1 1 0 1 1 1M ′1 :
a b a > d(ψ) b a
0 1 1 0(M ′|η)1 :
b a
First observe that M1 is bisimilar to the model depicted below it, which is obtained from
taking a mirror-image copy of M and pasting that to M with a b-link. Similarly, we can
take two copies of that, etc., and we get some M ′′ where the rightmost state is at least n
steps away from the underlined (actual) p-state. Let now M ′ be as this M ′′ except that in
the right-most state p is true. This is the only state in M ′′ where b knows that a knows
that p. Formula abp is a distinguishing formula for that state. Using that, we can find
a distinguishing formula for any finite subset of M ′ and thus there is an announcement η
after which the three states as depicted remain, such that 〈η〉(ap ∧ ¬bap) is true in
M ′1, and thus
M ′1 |= 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap)
As before,
M1 |= ¬〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap)
On the other hand, M ′1 ≃
n M ′′1 , i.e., if you cut off the part of the model further away
from the actual state 1 than n steps, the models are bisimilar. Models that are n-bisimilar
satisfy the same formulas in L(♦, !) of modal depth at most n. Therefore, as d(ψ) ≤ n,
M ′1 |= ψ iff M
′′
1 |= ψ
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and thus, as M ′′1 ≃M1,
M ′1 |= ψ iff M1 |= ψ
Again, we obtained a contradiction.
3.4 Axiomatization and theory
The logic APAL has a complete infinitary axiomatization for the class S5, for which the
preferred reference is [22].1 This axiomatization contains one axiom and one derivation
rule involving the quantifier. The derivation rule is formulated using the so-called necessity
forms or admissible forms [56] defined as ϕ(♯) := ♯ | ϕ → ϕ(♯) | aϕ(♯) | [ϕ]ϕ(♯), where
ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉), where we used bold-face font to distinguish ϕ(♯) ∈ L♯ from ϕ ∈ L(♦, !, 〈!〉).
They are:
[!]ϕ→ [ψ]ϕ where ψ ∈ L(♦, !)
( ϕ([ψ]χ) for all ψ ∈ L(♦, !) ) implies ϕ([!]χ) where ϕ(♯) ∈ L♯
It is unknown if a finitary axiomatization exists. The axiomatization without the S5
axioms T, 4, and 5 seems complete for the class K, by an analogous completeness proof,
although this is not on record.
The logic APAL is not compact [21], it is undecidable [49] (the usual tiling argument
applies), and the model checking problem is PSPACE-complete [3], where this is shown
in [3] for an APAL variant called GAL, that we will present later, but the method also
applies to APAL.
3.5 Variations
A fair number of variations of APAL have seen the light, of which some are published,
some are still under development, and yet others have merely been stipulated. Prior to a
more detailed presentation, let us see some of this variation.
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ (APAL) [21]
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ (full APAL) [100]
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a Boolean ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ (BAPAL) [90]
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a positive ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ (APAL
+) [91]
3.5.1 Fully Arbitrary Announcements
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
where ϕ, ψ, 〈!〉ϕ, 〈ψ〉ϕ are all in the same language, so that in particular ψ is really ‘ar-
bitrary’ formula in that language. There is a problem with this: as already mentioned,
if this were a definition, it would be circular, as one of those ψ may be the formula 〈!〉ϕ.
1Publication [21] contains that axiomatization, but also an incorrect finitary axiomatization, see [20, 22]
for discussions and corrections.
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However, one can define a logic with quantification over announcements where the above
is a property of the logic, but not the semantics of the quantifier. In [100] a language
LOrd(, !, 〈!〉) is proposed with additional to the 〈!〉 quantifier also quantifiers 〈!α〉 for any
ordinal α. Let now Lα be the sublanguage only containing quantifiers 〈!β〉 for β ≤ α, then
we can define
Ms |= 〈!α〉ϕ iff there is ψ ∈ Lα such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is α ∈ Ord such that Ms |= 〈!α〉ϕ
The axiomatization of the logic is unclear, as the collection of 〈!〉β in the logical language
is a proper class.
3.5.2 Positive Announcements
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a positive ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
In a positive formula, an epistemic modality is never bound by a negation. The positive
formulas are defined as:
ϕ ::= p|¬p|ϕ ∨ ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|aϕ
The positive formulas correspond to the universal fragment in the first-order translation.2
They have the property that they are preserved after an informative update, such as the
execution of an announcement. They are therefore also successful : they remain true after
their announcement. The logic with this quantifier is called APAL+, for positive arbitrary
public announcement logic. All results reported here are for interpretation on class S5.
We emphasize that the usual public announcement is in the language of APAL+. Any
formula may be announced, also formulas that are not positive. The restriction is only on
the witnesses for the quantifier 〈!〉.
From a more semantic perspective we can observe that positive formulas are also pre-
served after a refinement of a given model (see Section 2). Then, given a model (S,R, V )
and T ⊆ S, T is called closed under refinements iff for all s, t ∈ S such that Ms  Mt, if
s ∈ T then t ∈ T . The denotation of a positive announcement is closed under refinements,
and dually, on finite models a subset of the domain that is closed under refinements is the
result of a positive announcement. This is a powerful tool to investigate APAL+. Section
7 is dedicated to refinements.
The logic APAL+ is incomparable in expressivity to APAL. This is not at all an obvious
result, as we are comparing two logics with different quantifiers. Both directions of this
2The above positive formulas are to be distinguished from their extension
ϕ ::= p|¬p|ϕ ∨ ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|aϕ|[¬ϕ]ϕ|[!]ϕ
that is also known as the positive formulas, and that figure in, for example, [94, 21], where the [!] in the
inductive case [!]ϕ is the APAL quantifier. The negation in [¬ϕ]ψ may appear strange at first sight but
this is a consequence of the semantics of public announcement: note that Ms |= [¬ϕ]ψ iff (Ms |= ¬ϕ
implies (M |ϕ)s |= ψ) iff (Ms |= ϕ or (M |ϕ)s |= ψ). An interesting question seems whether, if the [!] in
the inductive case [!]ϕ were, instead, the APAL+ quantifier, every extended positive formula is equivalent
to a positive formula.
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result have non-trivial proofs that cannot be easily sketched in this survey. Just as for
APAL, the complexity of model checking in APAL+ is PSPACE-complete. For details of
expressivity and model checking we refer to [91]. The (known) axiomatization of APAL+
is much like that of APAL (we merely replace witnesses for positive witnesses).
The logic APAL+ appears to be decidable. This is work in progress by van Ditmarsch,
French, and Hales. It is shown by a technique combining the S5 modalities for knowledge
with the KD4-like modalities for public announcements — we can alternatively see the
model transformation induced by a public announcement in dynamic epistemic logic as a
pair in the accessibility relation associated to that announcement, in a larger model that
is constructed from the direct sum of all model restrictions of a given model (as in [105]).
Decidability of APAL+ is interesting for potential applications. In many scenarios only
positive information change plays a role, given some initial information state containing
ignorance, such as security protocols with mutual acknowledgements by principals of mes-
sages with factual content.
3.5.3 Boolean Announcements
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a Boolean ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
A Boolean or a formula in propositional logic is a formula in L(∅). Boolean announcements
result in model restrictions, and, as public announcements only change the information
about the true value of propositional variables but not their actual value, such announced
Booleans remain true after (truthful!) announcement: Boolean announcements are suc-
cessful. Also, Booleans are positive formulas. The resulting logic BAPAL is decidable and
has a finitary axiomatization [90]. The results reported here are for class S5. The relevant
axiom and derivation rule are:
[!]ϕ→ [ψ0]ϕ where ψ0 ∈ L(∅)
ψ → [χ][p]ϕ implies ψ → [χ][!]ϕ where p 6∈ v(ψ), v(χ), v(ϕ)
Note that ψ → [χ]♯ is a necessity form. The difference between this BAPAL and the APAL
derivation rule is that (i) the APAL one is for all necessity forms, and, (ii) the APAL one
requires an infinity of premisses with [η] in the place of ♯, instead of a unique premisse
with [p] in the place of ♯.
The logic BAPAL is more expressive than PAL (which is shown as for APAL), and
BAPAL is not at least as expressive as APAL [90] (on class S5). However, it is unknown
if APAL is not at least as expressive as BAPAL. To prove that, one would somehow have
to show that the Boolean quantifier can be ‘simulated’ by an an APAL quantifier that is
properly entrenched in preconditions and postconditions relative to ϕ. This seems quite
hard. The proof that BAPAL is not at least as expressive as APAL uses, not surprisingly,
that the BAPAL quantifier does not quantify over arbitrarily large modal depth, as the
modal depth of Booleans is 0. The proof is instructive; note the similarity with the proof
in Section 3.3 using that APAL quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large modal depth.
Consider again the APAL formula 〈!〉(ap∧¬bap). Let us suppose that there exists
an equivalent formula ψ interpreted according to the BAPAL semantics (the languages
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of APAL and BAPAL are the same in this survey, so we need to distinguish APAL and
BAPAL by their semantics). Given the modal depth d(ψ) of ψ, consider models M1, M
ω
1 ,
and M ′1, with a difference between M
ω
1 and M
′
1 further away from the root than d(ψ),
ensuring that Mω1 ≃
d(ψ) M ′1. We also note that M1 ≃ M
ω
1 ; the bisimulation links all
p-states in Mω to the p-state in M , and all ¬p-states in Mω to the ¬p-state in M .
0
≃
1M1 :
a
0 1 1 0 100Mω1 :
b a b a
0 1 1 0 1011M ′1 :
b a b a> d(ψ)b
0 1 1 0(M ′|η)1 :
b a
As Mω1 ≃
d(ψ) M ′1, they both make ψ true or both make ψ false. On the other hand,
with the APAL quantifier we can use that the left-most state in M ′1 is the unique state
where abp. This allows us to construct a distinguishing formula for any finite subset
of this chain. Therefore, there is such an η such that M ′|η is a depicted, and therefore,
as (M ′|η)1 |= ap ∧ ¬bap, we have M
′
1 |= 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap). On the other hand,
M1 6|= 〈!〉(ap ∧ ¬bap). This is a contradiction, therefore, no such ψ exists.
3.5.4 APAL with memory
In APAL with memory (APALM) [26] instead of models M = (S,R, V ) we have models
M = (S, T, R, V ), where T ⊆ S, and where (S, S,R, V ) is an initial model (and where all
relations Ra are equivalence relations — the results are for class S5). The domain S is the
initial domain, whereas the domain T is the current domain, the current model restriction.
This additional structural information makes it possible to refer to what was true in the
past, as well as to what is true now. The logical language has additional operators to
access this historical information, namely ϕ0 (for ‘ϕ was initially true’), a constant 0 that
is true when the model is initial, and the universal modality U . The semantics for ϕ0 is
(where s ∈ T ):
(S, T, R, V )s |= ϕ
0 iff (S, S,R, V )s |= ϕ
The semantics for the quantifier is as in APAL! Namely
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
Different from APAL, the inductive construct 〈ϕ〉ψ now has the restriction that ϕ must
be quantifier-free. It is unclear how this restriction makes the logic different from the one
wherein, like in APAL, there are no restrictions on announcements.
Non-bisimilar states become bisimilar after an announcement, as states t and u in the
following model M , and its restriction M |p.
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0(s) 1(t) 1(u)
b a p
⇒ 1(t) 1(u)
a
The power of APALM is that it can distinguish between such (standardly) bisimilar states
because the model still remembers that that the states were different. We observe that
in M , the states t and u have different knowledge properties, for example, Mt |= ¬bp
whereas Mu |= bp. However, after the public announcement of p they have become
indistinguishable. In APALM, we can still distinguish the state t and u in M |p, because
(M |p)t |= (¬bp)
0 whereas (M |p)u |= (bp)
0.
APALM has a finitary axiomatization. That this is possible is related to the memory
feature of APALM, see [26, Section 3] and Louwe Kuijer’s analysis that is found on page
https://personal.us.es/hvd/errors.html. It is not known whether APALM is decid-
able. The memory feature makes it harder to compare APALM to other APAL variants.
There are also relations to the logic with modalities for what is true before an announce-
ment by [23].
3.5.5 Other variations of APAL
There are various other conceivable variations, in published or ongoing work, with the
constant goals to quantify over an as large fragment of formulas as possible, to have a
finitary axiomatization, to have a decidable satisfiability problem (such as the ‘mental
model’ arbitrary public announcement logic of [37]), or yet other logical or philosophical
motivations.
Almost Arbitrary Announcements
Ms |= 〈!→χ〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free ψ implying χ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
This version of APAL semantics has recently been suggested by Igor Sedlar (for a more
general setting of relevance logic, but where the above semantics is a special case). As in
APAL, the quantification in ‘almost-APAL’ is over quantifier-free formulas, however, only
over those formulas ψ that are at least as strong as a given formula χ (such that ϕ→ ψ is
valid). Equivalently, we quantify over all modally definable model restrictions of the given
model M that are submodels of M |χ.
The axiomatization of almost-APAL seems straightforward, by replacing the APAL
axiom and derivation rule by (where η(♯) is a necessity form):
[!→χ]ϕ→ [ψ]ϕ, for all quantifier-free ψ implying χ
From η([ψ]ϕ) for all quantifier-free ψ implying χ, infer η([!→χ]ϕ)
Completeness for the infinitary axiomatization can then be shown as usual, using the
method of [22]. It further appears that the logic is still undecidable, where the proof
method of [49] (see also the simplifications of [6]) applies: [!→⊤]ϕ is equivalent to [!]ϕ, so
that we can build a tiling of the plane as usual.
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It might be interesting to determine the relative expressivity of almost-APAL with re-
spect to other APAL-like logics, and to also contemplate an ‘at most as strong as’ quantifier,
with semantics
Ms |= 〈!χ→〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free ψ implied by χ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
In other words, now we quantify over all modally definable model restrictions of the given
model M that contain M |χ. Note that ([!χ→]ϕ ∧ [!→χ]ϕ) is equivalent to [!]ϕ.
Knowability logic The semantics of 〈!〉ϕ uses public announcement operators. Given
the semantics for public announcement it could therefore also be
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a ψ ∈ L such that Ms |= ψ and (M |ψ)s |= ϕ
Given the shape of the ‘knowability axiom’ ϕ → 〈!〉aϕ we can call this logic for the
language L(♦, 〈!〉) without announcements, knowability logic [88]. It is not known what its
axiomatization is (although, as Wiebe van der Hoek mentioned, we ‘know’ that it consists
of the validities of APAL without quantifiers). The axiom and rule for 〈!〉 in APAL need
to be replaced by something not using announcements.
Another such logic for knowability has been proposed in [107], now based on a relation-
restricting update, instead of a domain-restriction update (see Section 6).
A different and promising novel direction for knowability logic proposed (work in
progress) by Jie Fan is, recalling that 〈!〉aϕ means ‘ϕ is knowable’, to consider the lan-
guage where the two modalities 〈!〉 and a are bundled/packed. In other words, the
language of this logic is ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 〈!〉aϕ. Such bundled logics often have,
obviously, different axiomatizations, complexity (or decidability) of decision problems, etc.
[71, 104]. What is now the axiomatization? Is it less expressive than APAL? Decidable?
Arbitrary announcement as effort From the perspective of this survey, a rather dif-
ferent setting of arbitrary announcement is its interpretation as a kind of ‘effort’ modality:
if you can get to know a proposition after incorporating the informative consequences of an
announcement, this is like getting to know a proposition after making some effort. Instead
of quantifying over submodels reached by executing announcements, we can alternatively
reason over subsets of a given model reached by an alternative semantics for such an-
nouncements on models having more structure than the epistemic models central in this
survey. Roughly speaking, the semantics of arbitrary announcement now are:
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free observable ψ such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
where a formula is observable if the topological interior (a permitted subset) of its deno-
tation is true.
Examples of such richer structures are the subset spaces in the work by Parikh and
collaborators [38], or more topological, or topologically inspired, structures in publications
like [70, 28, 93, 29]. We refer to those works for details.
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Quantifying over formulas for subsets of atoms
Ms |= 〈!Q〉ϕ iff there is a ψ ∈ L(♦, !)|Q such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
where L(♦, !)|Q are the quantifier-free formulas only containing variables in Q ⊆ P . This
concerns work in progress by Mo Liu. If we require Q to be finite it appears that this
logic and APAL are incomparable. Another version of quantification over the language
restricted to atoms in a subset of P is
Ms |= 〈!〉ϕ iff there is a ψ ∈ L(♦, !)|P (ϕ) such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
So, in this case the restriction need not be parametrized by some Q ⊆ P , as it directly
depends on the variables occurring in the formula bound by the quantifier. Barteld Kooi
observed that this modality does not distribute over disjunction, i.e., 〈!〉ϕ ∨ 〈!〉ψ is not
equivalent to 〈!〉(ϕ ∨ ψ). Dually, [!]ϕ ∧ [!]ψ is not equivalent to [!](ϕ ∧ ψ).
Example 5 Consider again the formula 〈!〉(ap∧¬bap) used in the expressivity proofs
for APAL and the same models and announcement (see Section 3.3). Let M be the model
on the left.
00 10
01 11
a
a
b b p∨q⇒
10
01 11
a
b
We now have that
M10 6|= [!]((ap→ bap) ∧ ¬q)
M10 |= [!](ap→ bap)
M10 |= [!]¬q
The first is false because, as depicted:
M10 |= 〈p ∨ q〉(ap ∧ ¬bap), so
M10 |= 〈p ∨ q〉((ap ∧ ¬bap) ∨ q), and therefore
M10 |= 〈!〉((ap ∧ ¬bap) ∨ q), which is equivalent to
M10 6|= [!]((ap→ bap) ∧ ¬q).
The second is true because the only model restrictions containing 10 that we can obtain
with formulas involving p are {10, 11} and {10, 11, 00, 01}. The third is true because q is
false in state 10.
Therefore, [!]ϕ ∧ [!]ψ is not equivalent to [!](ϕ ∧ ψ).
17
3.6 Open problems
Open problems about APAL and its variants include:
• Does APAL have a finitary (RE) axiomatization?
• Is positive arbitary announcement logic decidable?
• Is Boolean arbitrary public announcement logic as least as expressive as APAL?
• What is the logic of almost arbitrary announcements?
• What is the logic of knowability?
4 Group announcement and coalition announcement
This section is devoted to group announcement logic GAL and coalition announcement logic
CAL. These are clearly also variations of APAL, but as they are more targeted towards
modeling aspects of agency and therefore have receive quite a bit of attention from that
community we deal with them separately in this survey.
4.1 Group Announcement Logic
Group Announcement Logic GAL is a variation of APAL with (instead of quantifiers 〈!〉)
quantifiers 〈!G〉ϕ, for any group of agents G ⊆ A, meaning ‘ϕ is true after a simultaneous
truthful announcement by the agents in G’ [4, 3]. As announcements can be true but not
truthful, and can be truthful but not true, we should first elaborate on the meaning of
‘truthful’. A public announcement is truthful when it is true. If such an announcement is
made by an agent it is truthful if it is known by that agent. If agent a truthfully says ψa we
therefore model this as the announcement aψa. Being truthful is then more informative
than merely being true: if ϕ is true and agent a does not know that, then if she says ϕ she
is not being truthful. On S5 models, truthful announcements made by agents are in fact
true, because aϕ implies ϕ in S5. But on other models, the announcement of ϕ by agent
a may be truthful but not true, as in the case of incorrect belief, when ¬ϕ ∧aϕ is true.
Let us now elaborate on the aspect of simultaneity. When three agents a, b, c respec-
tively say ψa, ψb, and ψc, we get the announcement aψa ∧bψb ∧cψc, etc. So these are
simultaneous and not successive announcements, as the latter would introduce Moorean
phenomena. We need not imagine everybody talking at the same time, which may be hard
on the listener when done simultaneously. Public announcement is a misnomer for a public
event, such as ‘the three children who know that they are muddy now step forward’ in the
muddy children problem. This is easy to observe when done simultaneously.
The semantics is as follows. A set of formulas is quantifier-free if all formulas in the set
are quantifier-free.
Ms |= 〈!G〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free {ψa | a ∈ G} such that Ms |= 〈
∧
a∈G
aψa〉ϕ
18
Given 〈!G〉ϕ we imagine the remaining agents in A \ G staying silent, and only listening.
Therefore, 〈!∅〉ϕ is equivalent to ϕ.
Example 6 Given are two agents a, b such that a knows whether p and b knows whether
q (and this is common knowledge), and let in fact p be true and q be false (the underlined
state). Anne (a) can achieve that Bill knows whether p, namely by informing him of the
value of p, and Bill (b) can similarly achieve that Anne knows whether q. Neither agent
can achieve both outcomes at the same time, but together they can achieve that.
10
11
ap
⇐a
00 10
01 11
b¬q⇒
b
b
a a
00 10
b
We can evaluate in the square model in the middle that
• 10 |= 〈!a〉bp but 10 6|= 〈!b〉bp
• 10 |= 〈!b〉a¬q but 10 6|= 〈!a〉a¬q
• 10 |= 〈!ab〉(bp ∧a¬q) but 10 6|= 〈!a〉(bp ∧a¬q) and 10 6|= 〈!b〉(bp ∧a¬q)
Whatever the actual state, a and b can get to know it on this model by ‘collaborating’ in
the 〈!ab〉 sense.
A number of GAL validities are as follows, where G,H ⊆ A.
• 〈!G〉〈!H〉ϕ→ 〈!G∪H〉ϕ
If an announcement by group G is followed by an announcement by group H , then
G and H could have made a joint announcement with the same informative content.
• 〈!G〉〈!G〉ϕ→ 〈!G〉ϕ
A corollary of the previous.
• 〈!G〉[!H ]ϕ→ [!H ]〈!G〉ϕ
Church-Rosser for different groups of agents: let those in G announce something and
those in H announce something else, then there is a subsequent H announcement in
the first case and a subsequent G announcement in the second case that reaches the
same epistemic state again, modulo bisimilarity.
The proof of CR from [3, Prop. 10, page 68] might need a similar adjustment as the proof
of CR for APAL in [21] (as mentioned before).
The logic GAL shares various properties with APAL, e.g., the infinitary axiomatization
is similar and the method to prove completeness, and the model checking complexity is
PSPACE-complete, and it is also undecidable [5, 6]. Expressivity is discussed later.
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4.2 Coalition Announcement Logic
Another variation on APAL with aspects of agency is coalition announcement logic CAL.
In group announcement logic GAL we investigate the consequences of the simultaneous
announcement by G. The agents not in G do not take part in the action. In CAL we
quantify over what the agents in G can achieve by their joint announcement, no matter
what the other agents simultaneously announce.
In the logical language we replace the GAL quantifier 〈!G〉 by the CAL quantifier 〈[!G]〉,
where G ⊆ A (the notation should suggest its ∃∀-semantics, and that of the dual [〈!G〉] its
∀∃-semantics). The semantics of coalition announcement is then as follows.
Ms |= 〈[!G]〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free {ψa | a ∈ G} such that
for all quantifier-free {ψa | a /∈ G}
Ms |=
∧
a∈Gaψa and Ms |= [
∧
a∈Aaψa]ϕ
Example 7 Consider again the four-state model of Example 6. Although we have that
10 |= 〈!a〉¬a¬q (namely by simply doing nothing / announcing ⊤), it is not the case that
10 |= 〈[!a]〉¬a¬q: agent b can prevent a from remaining ignorant by announcing ¬q. It
then does not matter whether a announces p or ⊤ (as in the figure below), either way a
will learn ¬q.
10
ap∧b¬q⇐
00 10
01 11
a⊤∧b¬q⇒
b
b
a a
00 10
b
We still have that 10 |= 〈[!ab]〉(bp ∧ a¬q) — but this is trivial, as there are no other
agents around to say something to prevent it. The power of group announcements by all
agents is the same as that of an announcement by that grand coalition: 〈!A〉ϕ↔ 〈[!A]〉ϕ.
The logic CAL was proposed and summarily discussed in [4]. No axiomatization is given
there, and this remains an open question. Publication [4] also contains a summary but
original neighbourhood semantics for the CAL quantifier. Given the ∃∀ character of its
semantics this is not surprising.
The logic CAL was a main focus of investigation in related works involving Galimullin
[50, 48, 52, 51], including as results a complete infinitary axiomatization for a logic com-
bining GAL and CAL (so with the two quantifiers 〈!G〉 and 〈[!G]〉). They also contain
an axiomatization for CAL with an additional auxiliary operator bundling an announce-
ment by agents in G with a quantification over a announcement by agents not in G. This
technical device then facilitates proving completeness for the axiomatization.
The undecidability (of satisfiability) of CAL is shown in [6], in an integrated setting
also including APAL and GAL (and that simplifies prior proofs for APAL [49] and GAL
[5]). The PSPACE complexity is shown in [53].
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4.3 GAL and CAL, and expressivity
The logics GAL and CAL are related in interesting ways. As mentioned in Example 7, if
all agents A together can achieve ϕ in GAL, then obviously as well in CAL, as there are
no remaining agents to counteract it:
〈!A〉ϕ→ 〈[!A]〉ϕ
On the other hand, if the empty coalition ∅ can achieve ϕ in CAL, then ϕ will be true
after any GAL announcement:
〈[!∅]〉ϕ→ [!A]ϕ
Continuing along that line, as this is equivalent to 〈[!∅]〉ϕ → 〈!∅〉[!A]ϕ, it was conjectured
[88] that the CAL quantifier might be definable in terms of the GAL quantifier as follows.
〈[!G]〉ϕ↔ 〈!G〉[!A\G]ϕ
This schema can be paraphrased as: there is something that the agents in G can say no
matter what the agents not in G say simultaneously, iff there there is something that the
agents in G can say no matter what the agents not in G say subsequently.
If the conjecture had been true, GAL would have been at least as expressive as CAL.
Then, showing that GAL is as expressive as CAL would have seemed within reach. How-
ever, in recent works on the relative expressivity of GAL and CAL (and APAL) [51] it
was shown that this conjecture is false. It is false because non-bisimilar states can become
bisimilar after an announcement (we recall the discussion on APAL with memory [26]).
The agents not involved in that announcement are then no longer able to distinguish be-
tween those states in a subsequent announcement. However, they can prevent this if they
can make a simultaneous announcement, as in the following example.
Example 8 Consider the models below for a single variable p. As usual we assume tran-
sitivity of the accessibility relation. Note that in model M formula a¬p is only true in
state v, so that it (or ♦ap) is distinguishing between v and its complement.
M : 1 0 1 0 1 0
u′ t′ s t u vac a a ac b
N : 1 0 1 0 1 0
a a ac
M |♦ap : 1 0 1 0 1
ac a a ac
M |♦ap : 1 0 1
a ac
The reader can easily check that
Ms 6|= [!a]〈!bc〉 (♦ac¬p ∧ ♦acp ∧ ♦a¬(cp ∨c¬p))
Ms |= [〈!a〉] (♦ac¬p ∧ ♦acp ∧ ♦a¬(cp ∨c¬p))
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from which follows that 〈[!G]〉ϕ ↔ 〈!G〉[!A\G]ϕ is not valid for all ϕ, for A = {a, b, c} and
G = {a}.
The first is the case because if a announces ♦ap (as depicted), in model M |♦ap states t
and t′, and u and u′, are bisimilar. The bisimulation contraction is shown below it. After
that announcement by a, agents b and c can no longer make the formula ♦ac¬p∧♦acp∧
♦a¬(cp ∨c¬p) true.
Whereas if they can make their announcement simultaneously with a, they can still
use that u and u′ are different. For example, if a again were to announce ♦ap, b can
simultaneously announce ϕb := ¬b(p∧¬(cp∨c¬p)) (the complement of ϕb is only true
in M ′u) and c can simultaneously announce ⊤ (i.e., c⊤). From this joint announcement
by a, b, c model N results, in which ♦ac¬p∧♦acp∧♦a¬(cp∨c¬p) is true. The only
other announcement a can initially make in state s is ⊤, and then b and c can also enforce
N , by respective announcements ϕb and ¬ca¬p (of which the complement is only true
in Mv).
Example 8 is a simple demonstration of the differences between GAL and CAL. But
it is not an expressivity proof. In [51] it is shown that GAL is not at least as expressive
as CAL. This proof is, we think, not so simple. It is unknown whether CAL is at least as
expressive as GAL. A corollary in [51] is that GAL is not at least as expressive as APAL.
As in [3] it was already shown that APAL is not at least as expressive as GAL, GAL and
APAL are therefore incomparable [51, Theorem 5.6].
4.4 Applications
Agency The expression 〈!G〉ϕ has the smell of ‘group of agents G is able to achieve ϕ’,
such that, taking a single agent, a〈!a〉ϕ (on S5 models) seems to formalize that agent a
knows that she is able to achieve ϕ, as in logics combining agency and knowledge [63, 2, 87].
These are tricky issues in the setting for group announcements. For example (see [4] and
[3, Prop. 27]):
• a〈!a〉ϕ→ 〈!a〉ϕ is valid.
‘If you know that you can do something, you can do it.’
• 〈!a〉aϕ→ a〈!a〉ϕ is valid.
This is known as ‘knowledge de re implies knowledge de dicto’. Also valid is 〈!a〉aϕ→
a〈!a〉aϕ.
• a〈!a〉ϕ→ 〈!a〉aϕ is not valid.
Paraphrased, this shows that ‘knowledge de dicto does not imply knowledge de re’.
In different states different announcements may be required to make ϕ true. As you
do not know what the actual state is, you therefore do not know what announcement
makes ϕ true in the actual state. You only know that in all states that you consider
possible there is an announcement that makes ϕ true. For example, in state s formula
ϕ is true after you announce p but not after you announce q; in indistinguishable
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state t formula ϕ is true after you announce q but not after you announce p. Should
you announce p or should you announce q? You are not able to achieve ϕ!
Security Given that 〈!G〉〈!G〉ϕ → 〈!G〉ϕ is valid in GAL (see above), and that we can
iterate this result for any finite sequence of announcements by group G, we can formalize
communication protocols consisting of finite executions in GAL. This includes commu-
nication protocols where agents take turns in saying something. If a announces ϕ and
subsequently b announces ψ, we can also see this as: simultaneously a announces ϕ and b
announces ⊤ (keeps quiet), and then, simultaneously a announces ⊤ and b announces ψ.
Of particular interest seems the formalization of security protocols executed by two princi-
pals Alice a and Bob b in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve e. If ϕ is some epistemic goal
(information goal) and ψ is a security constraint that needs to be preserved throughout
the execution, a finite protocol for a and b to learn the secret safely should observe
ψ → 〈!〉ab(ϕ ∧ ψ)
As GAL and APAL have incomparable expressivity this is probably not formalizable in
APAL (the shadow of doubt is because the incomparability proof uses three agents; it
therefore holds for more agents, but maybe not for less). Beyond GAL, in a security
setting one might wish to formalize that Cabcψ → 〈!〉ab(Cabcϕ ∧ Cabcψ), where Cabc is
the common knowledge modality. Interactions between quantifiers over information and
infinitary modalities are summarily addressed in Section 8.
Coalition Logic and Playability Coalition Logic [73] (related to Game Logic [72, 74])
can be embedded in CAL [4]. The following axioms of coalition logic are CAL validities.
(〈[!G]〉ϕ ∧ [〈!H〉]ϕ
′)→ 〈[!G∪H ]〉(ϕ ∧ ϕ
′) if G ∩H = ∅
[〈!∅〉]ϕ→ 〈[!A]〉ϕ
Somewhat similarly, the forcing operator {G} proposed by van Benthem in [79] quan-
tifies over sequences of moves/actions; see also [83]. As 〈[!G]〉 models what coalition G can
achieve/force in any finite sequence of moves, this seems akin to the extensive game setting
of van Benthem. However, there are issues. The schema {G}{G}ϕ → {G}ϕ is valid for
the playability operator. But although {G}{G}ϕ→ {G}ϕ is valid in GAL, it is unknown
if the 〈[!G]〉〈[!G]〉ϕ→ 〈[!G]〉ϕ is valid in CAL [50, page 45].
And more The relation of GAL and CAL to (epistemic extensions of) logics of agency
such as ATL [8] and STIT [62] seems worth investigating. A logic much like CAL but in
an ATL/PDL-setting with the corresponding more explicit notion of agency, including a
complete axiomatization, was proposed by de Lima in [39, 40, 41].
For all such comparisons we should keep in mind that CAL (and GAL) do not have
factual change, which makes any result of restricted use for the other community. Of course
one can allow factual change, and quantify over that (see Section 8 on epistemic planning).
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4.5 Open problems
Open problems about GAL and CAL include:
• A complete axiomatization of CAL.
• Whether GAL is at least as expressive as CAL.
• An embedding of CAL with factual change into an epistemic extension of ATL.
5 Quantifying over action models
5.1 Arbitrary Action Model Logic
In the logic APAL we quantify over announcements, i.e., public events. We can also
quantify over events that may not be public, where the obvious suspect is to quantify over
action models. This was observed in [21, Section 5], including the obvious semantics, but
only truly realized in full splendour in various works by Hales [59, 60]. We expand the
language L(♦,⊗) of action model logic with a quantifier 〈⊗〉 with the following semantics
(where Ee is an epistemic action).
Ms |= 〈⊗〉ϕ iff there is a Ee with quantifier-free preconditions such that Ms |= 〈Ee〉ϕ
Let us call the resulting logic AAML, for arbitrary action model logic. We recall that in
APAL the quantifier over announcements adds expressivity and causes undecidability. It
may therefore come as a surprise that in AAML the quantifier does not add expressivity and
does not cause undecidability. The logic AAML is as expressive as action model logic AML
(and therefore as expressive as the logic K) because the quantifier 〈⊗〉 can be eliminated by
reduction axioms. More specifically, given 〈⊗〉ϕ, there is a multi-pointed action model ET
(where T ⊆ D(E)) such that 〈⊗〉ϕ→ 〈ET 〉ϕ is valid: given any formula ϕ ∈ L(♦,⊗, 〈⊗〉)
we can synthesize an action model (with quantifier-free preconditions) that, whenever
executable, always makes ϕ true afterwards. (We cannot always synthesize a single-pointed
action model. It may have to be multi-pointed, for example for the epistemic goal ϕ =
ap ∨a¬p.) Because of this, for the logic AAML we also have the property that
Ms |= 〈⊗〉ϕ iff there is a Ee such that Ms |= 〈Ee〉ϕ
without any language restriction on the preconditions of Ee (we recall a similar, much
harder to obtain, result for fully arbitrary public announcement logic [100], see Section
3.5).
The axiomatization of AAML in [59] is somewhat indirect as it uses a translation into
refinement modal logic [34]. This translation involves replacing the AAML quantifier by
the RML quantifier, and some additional arguments involving action models. Also, the [59]
presentation has parameterized quantifiers 〈⊗G〉 for G ⊆ A instead of a single quantifier
〈⊗〉, partly for technical reasons to make the translation work. We therefore do not give
the axiomatization in this section but only in Section 7 on refinement modal logic. We do
not know any results on the complexity of satisfiability of AAML.
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5.2 Variations
Quantifying over actions with precondition ϕ A public announcement ϕ is an event
similarly perceived by all agents with precondition ϕ, corresponding to a singleton action
model. Now consider any epistemic action with precondition ϕ. For example, any way that
Anne can inform Bill of p, no matter whether this is private or public, whether an third
agent Cath learns about it or not, and so on. Consider an additional inductive language
construct 〈⊗ϕ〉ψ for ‘after any action informing the agents of ϕ, ψ (is true)’. Its semantics
therefore are
Ms |= 〈⊗ϕ〉ψ iff Ms |= ϕ ∧ 〈⊗〉ψ
or if we wish
Ms |= 〈⊗ϕ〉ψ iff there is a Ee with quantifier-free preconditions such that
pre(e) = ϕ and Ms |= 〈Ee〉ψ
Such a quantification was suggested by Aucher in [16], based on the approach in [15]
proposing instead of action models an action language, on a par with the static language.
A somewhat similar quantification is found in [40], but in relation to coalitional actions.
It is clear that 〈⊗ϕ〉 is definable in the language L(♦,⊗, 〈⊗〉), as its semantics are the
definition. It seems not so clear if 〈⊗〉 is also definable in the language with 〈⊗ϕ〉modalities,
as these modalities appear to have an aspect of bundling/packing. Semantically, we now
want that 〈⊗〉ψ iff (there is a ϕ such that 〈⊗ϕ〉ψ). To get rid of the quantification over ϕ
seems to require to synthesize that ϕ from ψ (maybe including the pointed action model
for which it is the precondition).3
Quantifying over uniform action models We recall group announcement logic GAL
where we quantify over known announcements simultaneously made by the agents in group
G ⊆ A and coalition announcement logic CAL where we quantify over known announce-
ments simultaneously made by the agents in group G ⊆ A no matter what (known) an-
nouncements are also simultaneously made by the agents not in G. We can also consider
such quantifications over any informative action ‘involving agents in G’. Under such con-
ditions of partial observability it makes sense to require that agents have the same precon-
dition (‘say the same thing’) in for them indistinguishable actions. Consider the following
notion of uniform action model. When uniformity plays a role (and for the static mod-
els wherein such actions are executed) we typically have accessibility relations Ra for the
agents that are equivalence relations, i.e., indistinguishability relations.
An action model E where E = (S,R, pre) is a G-uniform action model (where G ⊆ A)
iff all preconditions of actions e ∈ S have shape pre(e) =
∧
a∈Gaϕa and if for all a ∈ G and
for all e, f ∈ S, if Raef , pre(e) = pre(f). Further, a uniform action model is a A-uniform
action model. In other words: in indistinguishable actions the agents involved in the action
3Given the AAML validity 〈⊗〉ϕ → 〈ET 〉ϕ, a good candidate for that ϕ seems any of the pre(t) for
t ∈ T , or even
∨
t∈T
pre(t).
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announce/act the same, although they may be uncertain about the announcements/actions
of other agents. A G-uniform epistemic action is a pointed G-uniform action model.
Similarly to GAL and CAL we now expand the logical language L(♦,⊗) with modalities
〈⊗G〉 and 〈[⊗G]〉, respectively, and with the following semantics. (This 〈⊗G〉 is unrelated
to the occurrence of that operator featuring in the prior section 5.1 with the discussion of
Hales’ work). For the 〈[⊗G]〉 semantics we need one additional notion for convenience: given
two uniform action models E = (S,R, pre) and E ′ = (S,R, pre′) (with the same frame but
maybe different preconditions), we define E ≡G E
′ iff for all e ∈ S, if pre(e) =
∧
a∈Aaϕa
and pre′(e) =
∧
a∈Aaϕ
′
a, then for all a ∈ G, ϕa = ϕ
′
a. So the preconditions for agents G
in E and E ′ are the same, but for agents not in G they may be different.
Ms |= 〈⊗G〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free G-uniform Ee such that Ms |= 〈Ee〉ϕ
Ms |= 〈[⊗G]〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free uniform Ee such that
for all quantifier-free uniform E ′e′ with E
′
e′ ≡G Ee,Ms |= 〈E
′
e′〉ϕ
Example 9 Consider four agents Anne, Bill, Cath, and Dave. Anne and Bill have joint
access to a bank account (or a nuclear storage facility, whatever . . . ) by a secret code.
Anne’s secret code p is only known to her and Bill’s secret code q is only known to him.
They want to transfer their codes to Cath and Dave, respectively, without making them
public. Clearly, the way to do this is that Anne privately informs Cath and Bill privately
informs Dave, and such that these actions are commonly known to all. Let Kw iϕ (for
‘agent i knows whether ϕ’) abbreviate iϕ∨i¬ϕ. Then the specification of the problem
is that
(Kwap∧¬Kw bp∧Kw bq∧¬Kw aq)→ 〈⊗ab〉(Kw cp∧Kw dq∧¬Kw bp∧¬Kw dp∧¬Kw aq∧¬Kw cq)
The epistemic goal bound by the 〈⊗ab〉 quantifier can be realized by the following {a, b}-
uniform epistemic action. Note that it is also {a, b, c, d}-uniform, as c, d can be assumed
to perform the trivial action.
a¬p ∧b¬q
a¬p ∧bq
ap ∧b¬q
ap ∧bq
bd
bd
ac ac
The axiomatization of such logics with additional quantifiers 〈⊗G〉 and 〈[⊗G]〉 respectively
seems quite feasible, and one might expect decidable logics (although of high complexity)
and with reduction axioms eliminating all dynamic features, by combining features of the
axiomatizations of epistemic RML (interpreted on class S5) [61], of AAML (see above),
and of certain arrow update logics [99] (see the next section).
5.3 Open problems
• The axiomatization of logics with quantification over uniform action models.
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6 Arrow updates
In public announcement logic an updated model has a restricted domain, and this is not
different in action model logic, where the update is a domain-restricted modal product.
Instead of domain restrictions we can also consider updated models with restricted accessi-
bility relations. (Where we should mention that for either kind of restriction we principally
have in mind those that are with respect to modally definable subsets, i.e., denotations
for formulas in L(). For other restrictions, see Section 8.) Relational restrictions are
the basis for various dynamic epistemic logics [55, 107] where we focus on arrow update
logic AUL [65] and arrow update model logic AUML [66], for both of which versions with
quantification over information change have been proposed [98, 101, 99].
6.1 Arrow update logics
A pair in the accessibility relation of an epistemic model is also called an ‘arrow’. Given
pair (s, t) in relation R, state s is the source of the arrow and t is the target of the arrow. In
arrow update logic (AUL) [65] one specifies which arrows are preserved, by way of specifiying
what formulas should be satisfied at the source (state) of the arrow and the target (state)
of the arrow. This determines the model transformation. It is called an arrow update.
The logic AUL contains modalities for arrow updates. While restricting the relations,
in AUL the domain remains the same. Just as action model logic is a generalization of
public announcement logic wherein updated models can have larger modal complexity and
in particular larger domains (representing higher-order uncertainty over the information
change among the agents), a generalization of arrow update logic to a logic with so-called
arrow update models has also been proposed [66]. The arrow update of [65] is then a
singleton arrow update model. This logic is known as generalized arrow update logic or
arrow update model logic AUML.
We will present both logics simultaneously by way of presenting arrow update model
logic and defining arrow update logic as a special case.
Arrow update model Given a logical language L, an arrow update model U is a pair
(O,RR) where O is a non-empty domain (set) of outcomes (also denoted D(U)) and where
RR is an arrow relation RR : A→ P((O × L)× (O × L)).
For each agent a, the arrow relation links (outcome, formula) pairs to each other. We
write RRa for RR(a), and we write (o, ϕ)→a (o
′, ϕ′) for ((o, ϕ), (o′, ϕ′)) ∈ RRa, or even, if
the outcomes are unambiguous, ϕ →a ϕ
′. Formula ϕ is the source condition and formula
ϕ′ is the target condition of the a-labelled arrow from source o to target o′. The arrow
updates of AUL [65] correspond to singleton pointed arrow update models.
Given an epistemic model M = (S,R, V ) and an arrow update model (O,RR) the
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updated model M ∗ U = (S ′, R′, V ′) is defined as
S ′ = S ×O
For all a ∈ A,ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ L, s, s′ ∈ S, o, o′ ∈ O :
((s, o), (s′, o′)) ∈ R′a iff (s, s
′) ∈ Ra, (o, ϕ)→a (o
′, ϕ′),Ms |= ϕ, and Ms′ |= ϕ
′
For all p ∈ P :
V ′(p) = V (p)× O
Example 10 demonstrates how to execute an arrow update for a singleton arrow update
model with three arrows.
Example 10 Given initial uncertainty about p with both agents, a typical arrow update
is the action wherein Anne (a) opens an envelope containing the truth about p while Bill
(b) observes Anne reading the contents of the letter. We preserve all arrows satisfying one
of p→a p,¬p→a ¬p, and ⊤ →b ⊤ (as an arrow update is a singleton arrow update model,
instead of (o, ϕ)→a (o, ϕ
′) we may write ϕ→a ϕ
′). Therefore, only two arrows disappear,
¬p →a p and p →a ¬p. It is depicted below, including the simplified visualization (for
which it is harder to determine the update, as the arrows are not explicit).
0 1
ab
ab ab
⇒ 0 1
b
ab ab
0 1
ab ⇒ 0 1
b
Just as in action model logic, we wish to have a logical language and semantics with
modalities for arrow updates, which requires their inclusion in an inductive definition of the
logical language, subject to certain constraints in order to keep the language well-defined.
Syntax and semantics The language L(♦, ↑) of arrow update model logic AUML has
an additional inductive construct 〈Uo〉ϕ where U = (O,RR) with o ∈ O is an arrow update
model with O finite and with RRa finite for all a ∈ A, and with source and target conditions
that are formulas ϕ. We read 〈Uo〉ϕ as ‘after executing arrow update Uo, ϕ (is true)’.
In order to distinguish arrow update logic AUL from arrow update model logic AUML
the language for singleton arrow update models is called L(♦, ↑1).
Given a pointed epistemic model Ms and a pointed arrow update Uo, the semantics for
arrow update modality are as follows.
Ms |= 〈Uo〉ϕ iff (M ∗ U)(s,o) |= ϕ where M ∗ U is defined as above
The arrow update modality is self-dual: 〈Uo〉ϕ ↔ [Uo]ϕ. AUML is as expressive as the
base modal logic K, because every formula in L(♦, ↑) is equivalent to a formula in L(♦),
by a rewriting procedure. The crucial reduction axiom is as follows. The conjunction is
over all ‘arrows’ for agent a between outcomes o and o′ in the domain of U . We recall that
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there can be multiple arrows for each agent, such as the two arrows for agent a in Example
10.
[Uo]aϕ↔
∧
(o,ψ)→a(o′,ψ′)
(ψ → a(ψ
′ → [Uo′ ]ϕ)).
Results for arrow update logics are typically for class K and not for class S5, and it is
often unclear how to obtain comparable results, such as complete axiomatizations, when
restricting oneself to updates between models with equivalence relations.
6.2 Arbitary arrow update logics
A quantifier-free arrow update model is an arrow update model with all source and tar-
get conditions in L(♦, ↑). We obtain arbitrary arrow update logic AAUL by adding
an additional inductive construct 〈↑1〉 to to language L(♦, ↑1), thus obtaining language
L(♦, ↑1, 〈↑1〉), and with semantics
Ms |= 〈↑1〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free singleton Uo such that Ms |= 〈Uo〉ϕ
Similarly, we obtain arbitrary arrow update logic AAUML by adding an additional induc-
tive construct 〈↑〉 to to language L(♦, ↑), thus obtaining language L(♦, ↑, 〈↑〉), and with
semantics
Ms |= 〈↑〉ϕ iff there is a quantifier-free Uo such that Ms |= 〈Uo〉ϕ
The logic AAUL has a complete axiomatization, is more expressive than the logic K, is
incomparable in expressivity to APAL [98], and it is undecidable [101]. Also, the model
checking problem is PSPACE-complete, as for APAL. Whereas the logic AAUML has also
a complete axiomatization, is as expressive than the logic K (by a rewriting procedure),
and is therefore decidable [99]. The complexity of satisfiable is unknown. The crucial
reduction axiom of AAUML is:
〈↑〉
∧
a∈A
(
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦aϕa ∧aψa) ↔
∧
a∈A
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦a〈↑〉(ϕa ∧ ψa)
A different incarnation of this axiom will feature in the next section on refinement modal
logic.
A precursor of arbitrary arrow update logic AAUL is the logical semantics for knowabil-
ity logic of [107]. The quantification in [107] is also over (equivalence) relational restriction
in a given model with constant domain. However, their quantifier is not bisimulation in-
variant, as the restriction is not parameterized by logical conditions such as the source and
target formulas of arrow update logic. The authors discuss alternative solutions to the
knowability paradox in their semantics. The dual of arrow preservation in arrow update
logics is arrow removal, as in [14].
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6.3 Open problems
• The axiomatization of arrow update logics on S5 models
• Synthesis for arrow update model logic on S5 models
7 Refinement modal logic
Refinement In arbitrary public announcement logic we quantify over announcements,
in arbitrary action model logic we quantify over action models, and in arbitrary arrow
update (model) logic we quantify over arrow updates. All these quantifications have in
common that the logical language contains operators for specific model transformations
corresponding to the execution of epistemic actions, and the quantification is defined in
terms of these modalities. In refinement modal logic RML we quantify over the refinements
of a given model. We recall that, from the requirements atoms, forth and back of a
bisimulation, a refinement relation satisfies atoms and back. A refinement of a given
model M is a model M ′ such that there is a refinement (relation) between M and M ′. The
semantics of the refinement quantifier directly uses this refinement relation. The language
of refinement modal logic does not have modalities for the execution of epistemic actions.
Given the properties of the refinement relation, a refinement can be seen a restriction
of a bisimilar copy of a given model. Consider the following elementary example.
Example 11 Consider the model M depicted below.
M• • • •
M ′• • •
M ′′• • • •
M ′′′• • • ••••
We note that:
• M ′ is a submodel (model restriction) of M .
• M ′′ is a refinement of M (arrows in bold font).
• M ′′′ is a bisimilar copy of M .
ModelM ′′ is a submodel ofM ′′′ that is a bisimilar copy ofM . ModelM ′′ is not a submodel
of M ! A refinement is a model restriction of a bisimilar copy of a model.
Example 12 Two models can be each other’s refinement, but not bisimilar. Consider the
models M and N depicted below. The dashed relation witnesses that N  M , and the
dotted relation that M  N . Still, M and N are not bisimilar.
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M : 7 4 5 6
N : 1 2 3
Refinement modal logic has been investigated in [89, 92, 34, 61, 58, 60, 35, 1, 108].
In these works, instead of the refinement relation as above (for the set of all agents) the
refinement relation has a parameter G ⊆ A, and apart from atoms, forth is required
for the agents in A \ G and back is required for the agents in G. As this was partly for
technical reasons, in this survey we only consider refinement for the set A of all agents,
which simplifies the presentation. Having said that, the language L(♦, 〈〉) of refinement
modal logic is the language L(♦) of multi-agent modal logic extended with an inductive
construct 〈〉ϕ, representing ‘there is a refinement after which ϕ’. It has the following
semantics.
Ms |= 〈〉ϕ iff there is M
′
s′ such that Ms M
′
s′ and M
′
s′ |= ϕ
As the refinement relation is transitive, reflexive, and confluent (for all x, y, z, if x  y and
x  z, there is w such that y  w and y  w), we also have for the refinement modality
that:
• []ϕ→ ϕ (T)
• 〈〉〈〉ϕ→ 〈〉ϕ (4)
• 〈〉[]ϕ→ []〈〉ϕ (Church-Rosser)
As for each pointed model there is a maximal refinement, namely removing all pairs from
all accessibility relations, it further seems clear that it satisfies the McKinsey schema
[]〈〉ϕ→ 〈〉[]ϕ, but this has not been observed in the literature.
Just as a refinement of a given model is a restriction of a bisimilar copy of that
model, refinement quantification is bisimulation quantification followed by relativization.
In bisimulation quantified logics we have explicit quantifiers ∀p over propositional variables
p [47, 103]. Relativization ϕp of a formula ϕ to a proposition p is a syntactic way to describe
model restrictions, such as the consequences of a public announcement: (M |p)s |= ϕ iff
Ms |= ϕ
p, see [69, 82]. In refinement modal logic, given ϕ ∈ L(♦), we have [34, Sect. 4.3]:
〈〉ϕ is equivalent to ∃p ϕp.
Relation between action models and refinement
Executing an action model produces a refinement of the initial model, and for
every refinement of a finite model there is an action model producing it.
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Given pointed model Ms and epistemic action Ee, the resulting (M⊗E)(s,e) is a refinement
of Ms by way the relation Z consisting of all pairs (t, (t, f)) such that Mt |= pre(f). Some
states of the original model may get lost in the modal product, namely if there is no action
whose precondition can be executed there. But all ‘surviving’ (state,action)-pairs simply
can be traced back to their first argument: clearly a refinement.
For the other direction, let refinement Nt of a finite model Ms be given, and let Z be
the refinement relation. Consider action model E that is isomorphic to N (for convenience
of the presentation we let the names of actions and states correspond), and wherein the
valuation of propositional variables in a states t′ of model N is replaced by a precondition
pre(t′) ∈ L(♦) of action t′ that is the distinguishing formula of the set of states s′ in M
such that (s′, t′) ∈ Z. As M is finite, this distinguishing formula exists [36, 78]. We now
have that Ms′ |= pre(t
′) iff (s′, t′) ∈ Z, and that (M ⊗ E)(s,t) is bisimilar to Nt.
This result does not hold on any model. For example, let M be the model consisting of
all valuations that are indistinguishable by a single agent. Removing all pairs of the acces-
sibility relation Ra results in a refinement of the model M . The action model producing
that must have an infinite domain and is therefore not in the language L(♦,⊗). This is not
to surprising. Fortunately, with respect to any formula ϕ ∈ L(♦) bound by the refinement
modality we have that [99, Theorem 28]
〈〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈⊗〉ϕ
〈〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈↑〉ϕ
〈↑〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈⊗〉ϕ
Essentially this means that these three quantifiers are interchangeable in any formula, by
an argument involving natural induction over quantifier occurrence, and reduction axioms.
It may be interesting to observe that, even though these three logics are as expressive as the
logic K, they differ in so-called update expressivity. Given the model class of interpretation,
this is the relation between pointed models induced by the respective updates. For such
matters see [67] and [99, Section 5].
Example 13 Recalling Example 2 on page 6, the picture below shows once more the
execution of an action model, now including the refinement relation between the initial
model and the updated model.
0 1 ⊗ p
⊤
= (1, p)
(0,⊤) (1,⊤)
ab
ab
b bb
0 1 1
0 1
ab
ab
b b
 

Axiomatization Instead of the axiomatization of RML in terms of parametrized refine-
ment quantifiers a reported in [34], we present an alternative axiomatization for RML
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with only refinement  for the set A of all agents. It is very directly based on the axioma-
tization of arbitrary arrow update logic in [99, Section 4, Theorem 19], that was partially
given in the previus section, where we recall the above-mentioned equivalence of 〈↑〉ϕ and
〈〉ϕ. It is simpler than the axiomatization in [34] and it has not been reported elsewhere
to our knowledge. We only list the reduction axioms for the 〈〉 quantifier, the final axiom
called A4 (as in [99]) is the crucial one.4
〈〉ϕ0 ↔ ϕ0 where ϕ0 ∈ L(∅)
〈〉(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (〈〉ϕ ∨ 〈〉ψ)
〈〉(ϕ0 ∧ ϕ)↔ (ϕ0 ∧ 〈〉ϕ) where ϕ0 ∈ L(∅)
〈〉
∧
a∈A(
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦aϕa ∧aψa)↔
∧
a∈A
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦a〈〉(ϕa ∧ ψa) A4
The complete axiomatization is a reduction system, and the logic RML is as expressive as
the multi-agent modal logic K. It is therefore also decidable, unlike APAL. The complexity
of RML is AEXPpol for single-agent version [35] (AEXPpol is the class of problems solvable
by alternating Turing machines running in single exponential time but only with a poly-
nomial number of alternations). The complexity is conjectured to be non-elementary for
multi-agent RML. In [1] a PSPACE upper bound is given for complexity of the so-called
existential fragment of (single-agent) RML (this is a negation normal form except that only
〈〉 and not [] may occur). Apart from refinement modal logic RML there is also refine-
ment µ-calculus, for various results on this µ-RML see [34] (µ-RML is non-elementary).
Epistemic RML The semantics of the refinement quantifier depend on the class of
models it quantifies over. In particular, quantifying over models from the class K is different
from quantifying over models from the class S5, a class of interest as the a modalities
then represent knowledge. The semantics is straightforward. Let M be an S5 model,
s ∈ D(M) and ϕ ∈ L(♦,), then
Ms |= 〈〉ϕ iff there is an S5 model M
′
s′ such that Ms M
′
s′ and M
′
s′ |= ϕ
But the axiomatization is not straightforward. The axiomatization of refinement model
logic on models with particular frame properties is not a conservative extension of the
axiomatization with respect to K. The axiom A4 above is unsound on class S5.
Example 14 Consider axiom A4, with Φa = {ap,¬ap} and ψa = ⊤, and consider a
two-state model wherein agent a does not know p. Then
♦a〈〉aap ∧ ♦a〈〉a¬ap
is true: agent a considers it possible that after having been informed of p she knows that
p, and she also consider it possible that after having been informed of ⊤ (after not having
been informed), she still does not know p. But
〈〉(♦aap ∧ ♦a¬ap)
4It further contains: all tautologies, the K axiom, Nec. for a, Modus Ponens, and the so-called
‘replacement of equivalents’ derivation rule ‘χ↔ ψ implies ϕ[χ/p]↔ ϕ[ψ/p]’. Nec. for [] is derivable.
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is false: in a refinement wherein ♦aap ∧ ♦a¬ap is true, because of the S5 validities
a¬aϕ ↔ ¬aϕ and aaϕ ↔ aϕ respectively, also ap ∧ ¬ap is true, which is
inconsistent.
Axiomatizations for refinement modal logic on a large variety of model classes, including
S5 and KD45 (consistent belief) can be found in [61, 60].
Simulation modal logic Instead of the language L(♦, 〈〉) of refinement modal logic
with the semantics
Ms |= 〈〉ϕ iff there is M
′
s′ such that Ms M
′
s′ and M
′
s′ |= ϕ
now consider the language L(♦,) of simulation modal logic with the semantics
Ms |= 〈〉ϕ iff there is M
′
s′ such that Ms M
′
s′ and M
′
s′ |= ϕ
This operator quantifies over the simulations of a given model instead of over its refine-
ments. This logic is investigated (and axiomatized) in [108], in a language and semantics
combining refinement and simulation in quantifiers. We recall the A4 axiom of RML.
〈〉
∧
a∈A
(
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦aϕa ∧aψa)↔
∧
a∈A
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦a〈〉(ϕa ∧ ψa)
The corresponding reduction for simulation is extrapolated from [108, Axiom CCRKco2].
〈〉
∧
a∈A
(
∧
ϕa∈Φa
♦aϕa ∧aψa)↔
∧
a∈A
a
∨
ϕa∈Φa
〈〉(ϕa ∧ ψa)
To understand what this means one should think of the refinement or simulation of some
given pointed model represented as a point-generated tree and with n = |Φa| successor
nodes, and for ψa in A4 take
∨
Φa (i.e.,
∨
ϕa∈Φa
ϕa). The left parts of these axioms specify
that for each successor node there is a ϕa ∈ Φa true there, and that for each ϕa ∈ Φa
there is a successor node wherein it is true (so this is the meaning of the cover modality
∇aΦa). Now in the case of refinement, this means that all those branches should have
been there in the original model, but maybe more. Refinement is some sort of submodel
of the initial model. Therefore on the right-hand side the agent still considers all that
possible (but maybe more, so there is no a). Whereas in the case of simulation, this
means that at most all those branches should have been there in the original model, but
maybe less. Simulation is some sort of model containing the initial model. Therefore, on
the right-hand side the agent still knows that one of those is necessary (but maybe less, so
we cannot guarantee all ♦a).
7.1 Open problems
• Given refinement modal µ-calculus, what are refinement CTL and refinement PDL?
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• What is simulation modal logic for a single simulation quantifier 〈〉 (for all agents)?
• What is the axiomatization of epistemic simulation modal logic (on class S5)?
• Synthese for different refinement and simulation modal logics.
8 Iterated updates, planning and group epistemics
The final two sections of this survey are somewhat more exploratory in nature.
Iterated updates So far, the pattern we investigated was: given a logic with a dynamic
modality 〈π〉, where π is some model transforming operation out of a parameter set Π (that
is possibly very large but typically enumerable), consider a modality for choice between all
such π. The meaning of 〈•〉ϕ is then that there is π ∈ Π such that 〈π〉ϕ. Considering π as
a program, • represents non-deterministic choice between all π, such that 〈•〉ϕ is 〈
⋃
Π π〉ϕ.
Most of our quantifiers satisfy 〈•〉〈•〉ϕ→ 〈•〉ϕ, which is not always obvious, as well as
〈•〉ϕ→ 〈•〉〈•〉ϕ, which is obvious. A sequence of two announcements ϕ and ψ is again an
announcement, namely that of 〈ϕ〉ψ (a PAL validity is 〈ϕ〉〈ψ〉χ↔ 〈〈ϕ〉ψ〉χ). A sequence of
two action models is the composition of those action models. A sequence of arrow updates
is an arrow update, and the relational composition of refinements and simulations is again
a refinement respectively a simulation. A group announcement by G followed by a group
announcement by H is again a group announcement, as 〈!G〉〈!H〉ϕ→ 〈!G∪H〉ϕ is a validity
of GAL.
This means that • is closed under arbitrary iteration, such that 〈•〉∗ϕ is equivalent
to 〈•〉ϕ, as 〈(
⋃
Π π)
∗〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈(
⋃
Π π)
∗〉ϕ. Alternatively to seeing • as non-
deterministic choice, we can therefore see it as arbitrary iteration, namely as (
⋃
Π π)
∗.
What about 〈π∗〉ϕ for a given π? We get a very different form of quantification over
information change if we merely consider arbitrary iteration (Kleene-∗ iteration) of a given
update operator π ∈ Π, and consider dynamic epistemic languages with modalities for
arbitrary iteration of dynamic modalities, so-called infinitary (dynamic) modalities.
Iterated updates have to our knowledge rarely been investigated as part of the dynamic
epistemic logical language. The exception is [69], wherein it is shown that already for very
simple settings (K models, mono-agent) the logic become undecidable. Possibly because
undecidable or not recursively axiomatizable logics might then result, the DEL community
appears to have stayed away from arbitarily iterated updates in the language. (Note that
the arbitrary iteration in epistemic PDL of [86] is not over the updates. The iteration is
over tests ?ϕ and epistemically interpretated modalities in order to formalize relativized
common knowledge.)
On the other hand, iterated updates has received much attention in dynamic epis-
temic logics in purely semantic investigations. These are ‘off-line’ (meta-level) analyses
of the consequences of iterated dynamics on given epistemic models described with the
‘usual’ languages L(♦), L(♦, !) or L(♦,⊗). We will not venture an exhaustive survey. The
more interesting of such proposals involve Moorean phenomena wherein the truth value
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of knowledge or ignorance propositions keep flipping back and forth. Let us name a few.
A most publishable unpublished work is [77] wherein updated epistemic models that are
the result of executing arbitrarily iterated finite action models display fascinating oscilla-
tions between stable points reached during such iterations. In [27] belief dynamics under
iterated revision is explored (belief revision is modelled as a particular form of update on
enriched epistemic models). This developed further into, or rather merged with, learning
theory investigating ‘asympotic’ knowledge properties of epistemic models after arbitrary
iteration of ‘learning’ input represented as action models [24, 33]. Iterated sincere and
insincere updates (lying) are modelled in [7], and it is shown that you can keep changing
your opinion on some matter of interest in arbitrarily haphazard and irregular ways up to
infinity (no very encouraging for everyday politics). In gossip protocols the informative
updates are ‘telephone calls’, where the denotation of such a protocol is a set of possibly
infinite call sequences. Given the restricted setting, the informative consequences of call
sequences are bounded: stable information points again in execution trees generated by
such protocols [9, 102]. Such analysis are PDL-style analyses and although such calls can
be modelled as action models [54], it is unclear how to associate a gossip protocol with a
‘DEL-style’ update modality, except in the case of protocols where all executions are finite.
From arbitrary iteration from arbitrary update and vice versa The gap between
arbitrary information change, modeled as choice or quantification, and iterating specific
information change is not as wide as it may appear on first sight.
On the one hand, quantification is not always so arbitrary and may be much more re-
stricted. We have seen various quantifiers over more restricted languages, such as arbitrary
positive and Boolean announcements, and arbitrary announcements restricted to formulas
with only atoms Q ⊆ P . This can be much more restricted and still arbitrary, for example,
quantifying over Boolean announcements of restricted sets of variables, quantifying over
action models for gossip, etc. Thus taming such logics into decidability, lower complexities,
finitary axiomatizations, and so on.
On the other hand, iteration of specific information change is not always specific and
may be iteration of a much more unrestricted set of epistemic actions. For example, it may
be iteration of choice between some finite set of actions, such as iteration of (any point in)
a given action model (as in epistemic planning, discussed below), etc.
Let us make this slightly more precise.
As said, given the set Π of all programs, quantification means
〈•〉ϕ iff there is π ∈ Π such that 〈π〉ϕ
If Π′ ⊆ Π is some subset (the Booleans, the positive formulas, . . . ) we get
〈•〉ϕ iff there is π ∈ Π′ such that 〈π〉ϕ
If such a Π′ is a finite set, for example, all valuations of a finite set of atoms, or a finite
set of (finite) action models, there is a direct representation as a linguistic object. For
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example, for a finite set of finite action models5 we can take their direct sum σ := ⊕Π′π
and we then get
〈•〉ϕ iff 〈σ〉ϕ
We now recall that our quantifiers are typically closed under iteration and satisfy 〈•〉ϕ↔
〈•〉〈•〉ϕ and therefore 〈•〉ϕ ↔ 〈•〉∗ϕ. Now if the set of updates represented by σ is still
transitively closed we get
〈•〉ϕ iff 〈σ∗〉ϕ
and we finally have arbitrary iteration an an alternative to arbitrary choice as desired.
Unfortunately this is a rather big ‘if’. When reducing the set of epistemic actions that
we quantify over, it may no longer be closed under iteration. But for some such sets it
remains closed under iteration: announcements of Booleans for a finite set of propositional
variables, the set of call sequences in gossip protocols, etc. There is hope. There is a
community wherein this is very actively investigated, in particular inasfar as this may
establish decision procedures: epistemic planning.
Epistemic planning Let us assume multi-agent S5 models. An epistemic planning
problem consists of an initial state s, a finite set Σ of epistemic actions, and a goal formula
γ ∈ L(♦) [32, 31]. Let us assume that we can describe this initial state s in logic by a
formula δ ∈ L(♦). This assumption is not entirely warranted: assuming the initial state
to be in finite model M , pointed model Ms has characteristic formula δ in the language of
epistemic logic plus common knowledge, but not necessarily in L(♦). On this assumption
however, solving an epistemic planning problem becomes the question whether
δ → 〈(
⋃
Σ
σ)∗〉γ
is satisfiable. As the set of epistemic actions Σ for the given planning problem is finite,
we can view
⋃
Σ σ as a single object τ , as above. The problem whether δ → 〈τ
∗〉γ is
satisfiable is often undecidable [18], and the target in epistemic planning community is
to find decidable (if not tractable) planning problems. The undecidability of δ → 〈τ ∗〉γ
resides in the part 〈τ ∗〉 (and how it depends on the epistemic goal γ), not in parts δ or γ.
Let us now see this 〈τ ∗〉 as some quantifier 〈•〉, as suggested in the previous paragraph.
It seems that this epistemic planning problem is undecidable if and only if the logic with
language L(♦, 〈•〉 (and with possibly other modalities, such as for action models or public
announcements) is undecidable. The search for decidable logics with quantification over
information change seems similar to the search for decidable planning problems, and is
related to epistemic synthesis in general.
There is a difference in scale. Expression δ → 〈•〉γ contains a single quantifier. But
given a formula 〈τ ∗〉ϕ where ϕ ∈ L(♦, 〈•〉), the ϕ bound by the quantifier 〈•〉 may contain
5We can also consider the direct sum of all finite action models. This is an action model, but it is no
longer finite, and it can therefore not feature as an action model modality in the logical language.
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other 〈•〉 quantifiers. So, if decidable, the complexity of such a logic tends to be higher
than the complexity of determining the satisfiability of a formula containing a single 〈•〉.
There is also a difference in focus. Epistemic planning in its incarnation in dynamic
epistemic logic is typically not only about information change but also about factual change
(we recall Section 4.4 on applications of GAL/CAL). If we allow factual change in logics
with quantification over information change, the quantification is over an even larger set
of epistemic actions / programs. For example, if in arbitrary action model logic AAML we
quantify over action models with preconditions and postconditions, any consistent formula
is realizable. As already noted in [95, Prop. 12 & Cor. 14], 〈⊗〉ϕ is then valid for any
consistent ϕ, because under these further relaxed conditions you can transform any pointed
epistemic model into any other pointed epistemic model (for the same parameter sets of
agents and atoms). Which seems pointless. For more restricted quantifiers, widening the
scope of logics with quantification over information change to factual change makes much
sense.
Group epistemic operators Let us consider for a while logics with group epistemic
operators, for a group G ⊆ A of agents. ‘Everybody in G knows ϕ’, EGϕ, is defined as the
conjunction of aϕ for all a ∈ G. ‘It is common knowledge between the agents in G that
ϕ’, CGϕ, can be defined as the arbitrary iteration of everybody knows ϕ, or semantically
as the truth of ϕ in all states reachable from a given state by the relation (
⋃
a∈GRa)
∗ (the
finite G-paths). ‘It is distributed knowledge between the agents in G that ϕ’, DGϕ, is
most conveniently defined as truth of ϕ in all states reachable from a given state by the
intersection relation
⋂
a∈GRa.
When adding common knowledge to public announcement logic, the public announce-
ment modality can no longer be eliminated from the language by reduction axioms, and
already the axiomatization is rather non-trivial [25, 97], which has led to the proposal of
relativized common knowledge [86]. Adding distributed knowledge to public announcement
logic is also non-trivial in yet other ways (again, the issue of completeness of the axioma-
tization, and a different notion of bisimulation) [106]. It is therefore not surprising that,
given the complications when going from PAL to APAL, no proposals have been made to
go even beyond that and, for example, axiomatize APAL with common knowledge. Given
the often surprising and unexpected expressivity results for logics wherein epistemic and
dynamic modalities interact, and also for logics wherein these interact with quantifiers over
dynamic modalities, this landscape is likely to be even more complex in the presence of
group epistemic operators.
Extensions of arbitrary action model logic AAML and refinement modal logic RML
with common knowledge or with distributed knowledge seems more manageable, because
the quantifiers can be eliminated from AAML and RML. It seems worth investigating if
they can still be eliminated from such extensions. Such extensions would be relevant for
epistemic planning and for information-based security protocols (we recall again Section
4.4), wherein distributedly known initial problem configurations and commonly known
epistemic goals are important.
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There are incidental works presenting quantifiers over information change in relation
to group epistemic operators. In [98, Section 4.3] the arbitary arrow update logic is shown
to be incomparable in expressivity common knowledge logic, on class S5. In [68] it is
shown that APAL with common knowledge does not have an infinitary axiomatization
(the validities are not recursively enumerable); we recall this is an unresolved question
about APAL without common knowledge. In [51] various expressivity results for group
announcement logic with distributed knowledge are presented.
8.1 Open problems
• Dynamic epistemic logics with arbitrary iteration of updates
• Axiomatization of logics with group epistemic operators and with quantification
• A dynamic epistemic logic of gossip
• Quantifying over information change and factual change
9 Changing models with modalities
We have dwelled a long time within the confinement of dynamic epistemic logics, and
the various ways to generalize their information changing modalities by quantifying over
such operations. There is a rather different direction to approach such matters and that
is not intended to model information change, namely various modal (and typically not
epistemic) logics with model transforming operators, including fairly theoretical general-
izations towards modal µ-calculus and the identification of corresponding first-order frag-
ments [76, 84]. We do not wish to present these in detail, but to point out some ways in
which dynamic epistemic logics can benefit from results obtained in such investigations.
Why is this a different direction? We recall the notion of update expressivity investi-
gating updates as relations between pointed epistemic models. On a class of models, an
epistemic action such as a public announcement induces a relation between pointed mod-
els, for example for the announcement of ϕ this is the relation contains all pairs (Ms,M
′
s′)
such that M ′s′ is (bisimilar to) (M |ϕ)s. When quantifying over information change, we are
investigating relations containing such relations for specific updates. In particular, these
quantifiers do not induce novel model transformations. The model changing logics of this
section also induce updates between pointed models. But they typically investigate rela-
tions contained in such relations for specific updates (and that are typically much harder
to characterize in the restricted logical languages of our survey). These are much more
fine-grained updates, and those works are all about investigating novel model transforma-
tions. They need not be multi-agent logics, i.e., they only have a single modality ♦ but
often not various modalities ♦a for a a member of some set A.
Let us see a few of such model transforming logics, as reported in [76, 81, 84, 17, 10,
44, 13, 12, 19, 57].
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Sabotage, bridge and swap Van Benthem proposed sabotage games [81] wherein a
network with multiple connections between nodes is given, a player called Runner attempts
to travel between two given nodes in the network and a player Blocker attempts to sabotage
the first player by removing nodes in the network after every move of Runner. If Runner
cannot reach his destination, Blocker wins. Otherwise, Runner wins. The focus of [81] is
on the complexities of solving such games (determine the winner). The modal semantics
proposed in [81, p.271] models removing a link between destination nodes as the removing
(deleting) a state in a corresponding Kripke model:
Ms |= 〈−〉ϕ iff there is a t 6= s such that (M−t)s |= ϕ
where M− t is the model restriction of M to D(M) \ {t}. The inequality requirement
indicates a relation with the difference operator proposed in [42]. We can also see this as
‘poisoning’ or colouring that state, i.e., forbidding passage through it, as in e.g. [57]. Issues
with axiomatizing sabotage modal logic and relations to other relation changing modal
logics are presented in [19].
Another semantics for the sabotage modality, propagated in later works and also in
various works by Areces et al. [10, 44] interprets removing the sabotage modality as
removing a pair from the accessibility relation in a model. We then get:
Ms |= 〈−〉ϕ iff there is a (t, u) ∈ R such that (M |R
−tu)s |= ϕ
where M |R−tu is the restriction of M to the relation R− defined as R′ = R \ {(t, u)}.
Instead of removing a pair from the relation, we can also add a pair to the relation,
also known as making a bridge between states:
Ms |= 〈+〉ϕ iff there are t, u ∈ D(M) such that (M |R
+tu)s |= ϕ
where M |R+tu is as M except that R+ = R ∪ {(t, u)}. or we can change the direction of
the arrow, known as making a swap between states [10, 44]:
Ms |= 〈⇄〉ϕ iff there are t, u ∈ D(M) such that (M |R
tu)s |= ϕ
where M |Rtu is as M except that Rtu = R \ {(t, u)} ∪ {(u, t)}.
Local and global change One should distinguish model change independent from the
state of evaluation from model change relative to the state of evaluation. The former is
called global change and the latter is called local change. The original sabotage semantics
from [81] is local in that sense: we remove a state different from the actual state. So, the
local semantics has shape: Ms |= 〈•〉ϕ if ϕ is true in M
′
s where M
′ is different fromM with
respect to the set R(s) of states accessible from s. Sabotage semantics is local with respect
to the relation for the universal modality. For the sabotage, swap, and bridge updates of
Areces et al. both global and local versions have been proposed, and see also [17]. All
updates in dynamic epistemic logic that we have seen in prior sections are global.
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In such logics we can count. If you remove a state from the domain, the resulting
domain contains one state less, so if you do this three times it contains three states less.
We can therefore how many states there are in the domain, as in (for example) the graded
modal logics of [45]. These require more refined notions of bisimulation [19].
In such logics we can give names to the states in domain. If you remove a state from
the domain different from the actual state, this allows you to refer to the actual state in
the logical language, as in hybrid logics. Relation changing logics are modelled as hybrid
logics in [11].
When we can count worlds and give them names, the logics may lack (finitary) Hilbert-
style axiomatizations and may be undecidable, which is indeed the case [19, 13, 12]. On
such issues these are much more difficult logics to investigate than most dynamic epistemic
logics.
Dynamic epistemic logics and relation change Let us now observe some relations
between such (sometimes domain changing but often) relation changing modal logics and
the dynamic epistemic logics presented in this survey. The dynamic epistemic model trans-
formations may be arbitrary iterations or fixpoints of the structural operations wherein a
mere pair of the relation is changed, as was observed in [76, 84].
Let us consider refinement modal logic RML. Removing a pair from the relation of a
model is a refinement of that model. Removing any finite number is also a refinement
of that model. As is removing any infinite number of pairs of the relation or the entire
relation, which may be the limit or fixpoint this operation (the models on which we perform
such operations need not have countable domains). So refinement modal logic RML is
clearly somehow related to sabotage modal logic. It may be interesting to investigate on
which class of models (all finite models?) we have that 〈〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈−〉∗ϕ. Now
sabotage modal logic is a fairly complex modal logic, and going to infinitary modalities such
as from 〈−〉 to 〈−〉∗ often makes life worse (admittedly: while retaining both modalities in
the language). But RML is a fairly simple modal logic: we can eliminate the refinement
quantifier and it is as expressive as the logic K (but we did not keep both modalities).
Similarly, simulation modal logic has iteration of the bridging modality, such that it is
envisageable for some model class that 〈〉ϕ is equivalent to 〈+〉∗ϕ.
We can also consider pairs of the accessibility relation with logical conditions, i.e.,
arrows with source or target formulas, as in the arrow update logics AUL and AUML.
First consider an arrow that does not satisfy a given formula at the target state, and
first consider a propositional variable p. Iterating the removal of arrows that do not
satisfy p at the target state until a fixpoint, leaves us with all arrows pointing to p states.
This corresponds to the ‘arrow eliminating’ semantics for public announcement of [55, 64].
Similarly, as noted in Section 6 on such arrow update logics, removing all arrows with
different values for p at source and target corresponds to the standard public announcement
semantics (but in the refinement sense of [85]).
However, public announcements is not just iterated sabotage relative to some formula
ϕ, because of Moorean phenomena. Iterated removal of arrows not satsifying ϕ at the
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target state need not be a fixpoint [77, 7], and even if it is, it need not correspond to the
public announcement of ϕ, because given some model M , in the model M−st wherein a
pair (s, t) such that Mt 6|= ϕ has been removed, the denotation of modal formulas ϕ may
not be the restriction of the denotation of ϕ in M to the new domain. How to view public
announcement as iterated ‘stepwise public announcement logic’ is discussed in [19].
Of course, we may iterate the procedure of removing pairs (s, t) where ϕ was originally
false in t, even when ϕ is not currently false in t. But for that we need either models with
memory (we recall [26]) or we need to store the original denotation of ϕ in a fresh variable
p with an assignment, and from then on remove arrows failing to satisfy p in the target.
These are more complex modelling solutions.
How to view updates induced by arrow update models or action models seems as iterated
sabotage seems more complex, as this may increase the modal complexity of the updated
domain (it can become bigger). For this it seems important to have a point-generated tree
representation of the model, as in refinement modal logic.
9.1 Open problems
• A decidable and axiomatizable relation-changing logic
• Refinement modal logic as sabotage modal logic with infinitary modalities
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